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Over the past few decades, there has been increasing interest in left-libertarianism, which holds 
(roughly) that agents fully own themselves and that natural resources (land, minerals, air, etc.) 
belong to everyone in some egalitarian sense. Left-libertarianism agrees with the more familiar 
right-libertarianism about self-ownership, but radically disagrees with it about the power to 
acquire ownership of natural resources. Merely being the first person to claim, discover, or mix 
labor with an unappropriated natural resource does not—left-libertarianism insists—generate a 
full private property right in that natural resource. 
 Left-libertarianism seems promising because it recognizes both strong individual rights of 
liberty and security and also grounds a strong demand for some kind of material equality. It 
seems, that is, to be a plausible a form of liberal egalitarianism. 
 In a recent review essay of a two volume anthology on left-libertarianism (edited by two 
of us), Barbara Fried has insightfully laid out most of the core issues that confront left-
libertarianism.1 We are each left-libertarians, and we would like to take this opportunity to 
address some of the general issues that she raises. We shall focus, as Fried does much of the 
time, on the question of whether left-libertarianism is a well-defined and distinct alternative to 
existing forms of liberal egalitarianism. More specifically, we shall address the following 
fundamental issues raised by Fried (and others): (1) Does the notion self-ownership have any 
determinate content? (2) What is the relation between self-ownership and world ownership? (3) 
How is left-libertarianism different from other forms of liberal egalitarianism (e.g., those of 
Rawls and Dworkin)? 
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 First, however, we shall set the context by providing some general background on left-
libertarianism. 
 
1. Background 
Left-libertarianism is a theory of justice that (like right-libertarianism) grounds justice in moral 
(as opposed to legal) property rights. Left-libertarianism rests on two central claims: (1) full 
initial self-ownership for all agents, and (2) egalitarian ownership of natural resources. Agents 
are full self-owners just in case they own themselves in just the same way that they can fully own 
inanimate objects. Stated slightly differently, full self-owners own themselves in the same way 
that a (full) chattel-slave-owner owns a slave.2 We shall explain this notion more carefully in the 
next section. 
 The second core claim of left-libertarianism is that natural resources are owned by all in 
some egalitarian manner. Natural resources are those things that have no moral standing (e.g., are 
not sentient) and have not been transformed by any non-divine agent. Thus, land, seas, air, 
minerals, etc. in their original (humanly unimproved) states are natural resources, whereas such 
things as chairs, buildings, and land cleared for farming are not. All left-libertarians agree that 
the ownership of natural resources is governed by an egalitarian principle, although there is some 
disagreement as to whether it is the current value of these resources in their unimproved state or 
that plus the value of our opportunities to improve them which should be equalized. 
  There are many forms of egalitarian ownership and thus many forms of left-
libertarianism. Here are a few possibilities. (1) Natural resources might be owned in common in 
the sense that each person is free to use (but not appropriate) them as long as she is not violating 
the self-ownership rights of others. (2) Natural resources might be jointly owned in the sense that 
any use, or perhaps only any appropriation, requires collective (e.g., majority) approval. (3) 
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Unilateral appropriation of unappropriated resources may be permitted as long as one pays to the 
members of society their per capita share of the full competitive value (based on supply and 
demand) of the rights that one claims.3 (4) Unilateral appropriation of unappropriated resources 
may be permitted as long as one appropriates no more than is compatible with everyone having 
an equally valuable opportunity for a good life.4 Of course, there are many other possibilities.5 
 There are, thus, many forms of left-libertarianism—just as there are many forms of other 
first order normative doctrines (such as utilitarianism and contractualism). All versions are, 
however, committed to full self-ownership and to some kind of egalitarian ownership of natural 
resources. 
 
2. The Determinacy of Full Self-Ownership 
Fried and others have suggested that the notion of full self-ownership is inherently indeterminate 
and has few concrete implications (e.g., because it can be interpreted in a variety of incompatible 
ways). We shall argue, however, that, although the notion has some indeterminacy, it has a 
significant determinate core. 
In order to establish this relative determinacy, we shall define full ownership using the 
following terminology. For a given object, first order property rights concern the permissible uses of 
the object. “Use” is here understood broadly to include all the ways that persons can physically 
impact upon an object, including effects that are unforeseen. Possession, occupation, incursion, and 
intrusion are forms of use in this stipulative sense. 
Full private ownership of an object consists of a full set of the following ownership 
rights: (1) control rights over the use of the object, (2) rights to compensation if someone uses 
the object without one’s permission, (3) enforcement rights (to prevent the violation of these 
rights or to extract compensation owed for past violation), (4) rights to transfer these rights to 
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others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan), and (5) immunity to the non-consensual loss of any of the 
rights of ownership.6 
 Full ownership, like ownership generally, is simply a bundle of particular rights. There is 
nothing magical about full ownership. It is simply (roughly) the logically strongest set of 
ownership rights over a thing that a person can have compatibly with others having such rights 
over everything else.7 Ownership can come in various degrees and forms (and few, if any, legal 
systems recognize full ownership in this logical sense). One can, for example, have full control 
rights over a thing without having the other rights. Left-libertarianism does not claim that 
ownership is either all or nothing. It claims that, as a matter of normative fact, agents (at least 
roughly) fully own themselves as opposed to not at all or something significantly weaker.8 This 
claim, of course, is controversial, but its defense is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 In her review (e.g., p. 72), Fried suggests that libertarians fail to take due account of the 
decomposability (fragmentability) of ownership implicit in Hohfeldian and Legal Realist 
analysis. No doubt some (perhaps many) libertarians have failed to recognize that property rights 
are indeed decomposable, but we fully accept this decomposability.9 Fried’s real target, we 
believe, is the view that full self-ownership has a relatively determinate content. We shall argue 
that, even though ownership generally, and full ownership in particular, is decomposable, full 
self-ownership has a relatively determinate content. 
 The above five kinds of ownership right can come in different strengths and the elements 
need not all be present in any particular bundle of ownership rights. We claim, however, that there is 
a relatively determinate set of full ownership rights. In this context, it is important to keep in mind 
that full ownership is not the strongest set of ownership rights that a person can have in a thing. It is 
rather the strongest set of such rights that is compatible with other people having the same rights 
over other things. More specifically, full self-ownership is the logically strongest set of ownership 
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rights that one can have over one’s person that is compatible with someone else having the same set 
kind of ownership rights over everything else in the world. Here and throughout, we take one set of 
rights to be logically stronger than another set if and only if the first contains all the rights of the 
second plus some additional ones. 
 Our claim is that, although full self-ownership involves some undeniable indeterminacy, it 
still has enough content to have significant normative force. Let us start by identifying the 
indeterminacy, which arises because there is no uniquely strongest set of ownership rights. This is 
so because strengthening one person’s compensation or enforcement rights weakens the 
immunity to loss of another person. Thus, there is no unique maximally strong set of ownership 
rights. Everyone could have very strong compensation and enforcement rights against those who 
violate their rights, but this would entail that everyone has a less than maximal immunity to loss 
of their ownership rights (since their liberty to use the things they own and the security against 
interference from others would be reduced when they violate the rights of others). Alternatively 
(to pick the other extreme), everyone could have very weak compensation and enforcement 
rights, while having a relatively strong immunity to loss. Neither set of rights is unequivocally 
stronger than the other.  
 The notion of full ownership is thus indeterminate with respect to compensation rights, 
enforcement rights, and immunity to loss when a person uses an object over which another has 
unwaived ownership rights. Full ownership can, that is, be interpreted in various ways with 
respect to the implications of one person violating the rights of another.  
 We claim that the indeterminacy generated by compensation rights and enforcement 
rights nonetheless leaves a significant amount of determinacy in the concept of full ownership. In 
particular, full ownership is quite determinate with respect to its implications where the owner 
has not made, and is not in the process of making, incursions onto the property of others without 
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their consent. In that case, the full owner of an object has full control rights, that is, (1) a full 
liberty to use the object (i.e., she is permitted to use the owned object as long as she has the 
permission of the owners of any other objects thereby used), and (2) a full security right over use 
of that object (i.e., no one else may use the object without her permission). There is no 
indeterminacy here.10 
 It’s important to note that this determinacy depends crucially on the fact that we are 
appealing to full ownership rights—and not to rights generally. If all possible rights were taken into 
account, then there would indeed be a radical indeterminacy. One person’s security right against 
others smashing “her” car would conflict with the liberty of others to use their hammers to smash it. 
This conflict, however, does not arise for ownership rights. The (control-right) liberty to use a 
hammer one owns does not conflict with anyone’s (control-right) security-right over a car she owns. 
This is because the liberty of use that is included in ownership rights does not entail that one may 
use the owned object in any way that one wants. It is not a general liberty of action. It only ensures 
that the use of the hammer as such is permissible (i.e., the mere fact that the owner uses the hammer 
without anyone else’s permission does not establish that such use is wrong). In order to be 
permissible, any particular act of using the hammer must also permissibly use all the other objects 
involved in that act (e.g., the car smashed). Hence, there is no conflict between one person’s 
security rights over one object and another person’s liberty rights over another. Full self-
ownership—a strongest set of ownership rights that a person can have over herself compatible 
others having the same rights over everything else in the world—thus determinately gives each 
person full security rights and full liberty rights over her person.  
 There is, however, an additional source of indeterminacy that we must recognize. Call the 
conception of full self-ownership characterized above “full self-ownership in the strict sense”. It has 
some rather radical implications. These include that one’s self-ownership is violated when another 
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agent performs an action for which (1) there is only a very small probability that it will result in an 
incursion against oneself, (2) if there is an incursion, the harm to oneself will be trivial, (3) the harm 
was not reasonably foreseeable, and (4) the benefits to others of performing the action are enormous 
(e.g., avoidance of social catastrophe). Thus, for example, strict full ownership of my body is 
violated, if, in the process of putting out a dangerous fire, you inadvertently send a small bit of stone 
one hundred yards away, where it lightly flicks my hand. Most people with strong libertarian 
inclinations will want to reject these implications and thus reject full self-ownership in the strict 
sense.11 
It is therefore useful to distinguish between strict libertarianism—which endorses full self-
ownership in the strict sense—and a looser kind of libertarianism, which requires endorsement of 
full self-ownership in a looser sense. For present purposes, let us count a form of self-ownership as 
full (in the looser sense) if and only if it agrees with full ownership in the strict sense, except 
perhaps when one or more of the above four conditions is satisfied. This introduces additional 
indeterminacy in the notion of full ownership (since the implications are left open when one of the 
four conditions is satisfied), but it still leaves a lot of significant content. For example, self-
ownership determinately rules out actions that are foreseeably highly likely to cause incursions on 
one’s person that will significantly harm one and where avoidance of a social catastrophe is not at 
issue. 
 In summary, although there is some significant indeterminacy in the notion of full self-
ownership in the strict sense, and some further indeterminacy in the more relevant notion of full 
self-ownership in the loose sense, that leaves a very significant core to the notion of full self-
ownership. It is thus a mistake to dismiss this notion as having no determinate content. 
 The relative determinacy of the concept of full self-ownership evidently leaves completely 
open whether, as a matter of normative fact, agents are full self-owners. Why, one might ask, should 
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we believe that agents are full self-owners in even the loose sense—as opposed to some weaker 
sense or not at all? This, of course, is a difficult issue, and we cannot here give an adequate answer. 
Part of the answer is that there is something theoretically plausible about the thesis of self-
ownership: we—and not others—are morally in charge of our bodies and our persons. It is wrong to 
kill us, strike us, have sex with us, or remove our body parts without our permission. Moreover, full 
self-ownership is both plausible in the abstract (we are fully in charge of our persons) and has a 
theoretical simplicity. To be sure, the plausibility of a principle does not depend solely on its 
theoretical attractiveness. It also depends on the plausibility of its concrete implications. Full self-
ownership admittedly has some counter-intuitive implications (e.g., the legitimacy of voluntary 
slavery and the absence of a legally enforceable duty to provide highly desirable personal services 
under certain circumstances). This, however, is true of all principles. A full defense of a principle 
requires a balancing of the abstract theoretical considerations with the plausibility of the concrete 
implications (e.g., as in reflective equilibrium). Our claim, undefended here, is that at least loose full 
self-ownership is justified by such a balancing procedure. 
 
3.  Self-Ownership and World Ownership 
Left-libertarians hold that—as a matter of natural right—agents initially fully own themselves 
and natural resources are owned in some egalitarian manner. It’s important to keep in mind that 
these are two independent assumptions. Contrary to what Fried suggests12, left-libertarians do not 
all hold that the egalitarian ownership of natural resources follows from their non-egalitarian 
libertarian commitments. We think it would, for example, be a mistake to hold that 
egalitarianism follows from universal full self-ownership, since the latter is compatible with a 
variety of non-egalitarian forms of ownership of natural resources.13 Instead, left-libertarians 
invoke egalitarian ownership of natural resources as an independent principle.  
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 To this, it may be replied that, although the two principles may be logically compatible, 
there is no coherence in the overall position.14 If coherence requires that the justification for each 
of one’s principles appeal to the same set of considerations, this may be correct, but then there is 
little reason to require coherence so understood. Left-libertarianism holds that there is a very 
significant difference in the moral status of agents (self-directing beings with full moral 
standing) and natural resources (resources that have no moral standing and which were created 
by no (non-divine) agent). About the former they maintain that full self-ownership is the most 
appropriate reflection of the status (e.g., because it explains/grounds the intuitive wrongness of 
various forms of non-consensual interference with bodily integrity), and about the latter they 
independently maintain that egalitarian ownership is the most defensible stance.  
Conceding that left-libertarian theories may have succeeded in vindicating the possibility 
of justifying more egalitarian redistribution than has standardly been assumed possible without 
violating the self-ownership constraint, Fried claims that there is no room in left-libertarian 
theory to compensate for unchosen inequalities in personal endowments.15 For although such 
compensating transfers might be justified by invoking “intuitions of fairness”, and although they 
might not be incompatible with the self-ownership constraint (i.e. because funded by taxes on 
natural resource values), those intuitions themselves cannot, she claims, be anchored in basic 
left-libertarian principles and look to be ones of purely egalitarian provenance. As such, it is 
claimed, their endorsement by left-libertarianism suggests, again, that it amounts to little more 
than “liberal egalitarianism in drag”. 
The first point to note in reply is that some left-libertarians (e.g., Steiner) argue that 
unchosen germ-line genetic information is a natural resource and thus among the items subject to 
egalitarian ownership. That is, this position derives compensation for unequal personal 
endowments from egalitarian ownership of natural resources. Other versions of left-
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libertarianism appeal, as Fried says, to intuitions of fairness to justify the claim that natural 
resources are to be divided so as to promote effective equality (and thus provide at least partial 
compensation for unequal unchosen person endowments). This does indeed make them a form of 
liberal egalitarianism. The proponents, however, are not in drag. They are proud, card-carrying 
liberal egalitarians. Moreover, as we shall now argue, they are a distinctive kind of liberal 
egalitarian. 
 
4. Left-Libertarianism as a Version of Liberal Egalitarianism 
Fried questions the distinctness of left-libertarianism for two reasons. First, she maintains that 
“the label ‘left-libertarianism’ houses disparate moral intuitions that share little but a name” (p. 
78). Hence it is a label which identifies a group of theorists whose positions fail to cohere with 
one another’s in any meaningful way.16 Second, she objects that many left-libertarians endorse a 
set of moral and political commitments that are indistinguishable from those of other, more 
familiar liberal egalitarians such as Rawls and Dworkin. This is problematic, she claims, given 
that left-libertarians aim to stake out “a middle ground between the two dominant strains of 
contemporary political philosophy: the conventional libertarianism of those such as Robert 
Nozick on the right, and the egalitarianism of those such as Rawls, Dworkin, and Sen on the left” 
(p. 67). One might also wonder, as Fried does, why one should “bother with left-libertarianism at 
all” if it simply converges on more conventional forms of liberal egalitarianism (p. 91). 
 In reply to the charge of failure of coherence, we note that, like most other ‘isms’ in 
moral and political philosophy, left-libertarianism is a family of theories, with the usual 
implications of what that means: namely, that member theories are strung out along a 
spectrum—or even several spectrums—with strong mutual affinities, but also conflicting 
particular conceptions of the overarching concept. Thus, different versions of left-libertarianism 
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invoke different conceptions of “near-full” self-ownership and different conceptions of 
egalitarian ownership of natural resources. Nonetheless, they are all committed to near-full self-
ownership and to the rejection of non-egalitarian forms of ownership of natural resources.  Left-
libertarianism is no less uniform in this regard than egalitarianism, consequentialism, and 
liberalism. Fried, for example, evinces no corresponding qualms about her preferred the concept 
of ‘liberal egalitarianism’, which is liberally employed throughout her piece. Yet any study of the 
writings of those who are categorized as liberal egalitarians will reveal a diversity of 
conceptions, some of which also fall within the scope of other partially overlapping concepts. 
This diversity and overlap is standard for any family of theories and is no less great than in the 
case of the concept ‘left-libertarianism’.17 
 Consider, then, Fried’s charge that left-libertarianism fails to distinguish itself from 
liberal egalitarianism. We begin by noting that not all left-libertarians aspire to be less egalitarian 
than such thinkers as Rawls and Dworkin. This is an accurate description of the aspirations of 
many but by no means all left-libertarians. Some left-libertarians wish to demonstrate that their 
libertarian commitments are at least nearly fully consistent with the egalitarianism of people such 
as Rawls and Dworkin.18 These left-libertarians seek common ground with liberal egalitarians 
rather than middle ground between them and right-libertarians. Those left-libertarians who want 
to occupy the common overlapping ground with some other liberal egalitarians (i.e., some luck 
egalitarians) obviously do not regard it as a criticism that their first-order commitments are 
virtually indistinguishable from those of these other liberal egalitarians.  
 What follows is a rough and ready map of the conceptual space which left-libertarianism 
occupies: 
 
 -----------------------------------Liberals--------------------------------- 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
--Strict Egalitarians19-- 
-------------------------------- 
    ------------Libertarians--------------- 
 
-----Rawlsians-----  -----Left-----  ----Right---- 
  -Luck Egalitarians20- 
--------------Liberal Egalitarians------------- 
 
Egalitarians------------------------------------- 
 
As this map indicates, left-libertarianism is both a form of libertarianism and a form of liberal 
egalitarianism. Moreover, the views of some left-libertarians converge upon—as indicated by the 
overlap—the views of some luck egalitarians. 
 To fill in some of the details of the above schema, the following are a few salient points 
of overlap and contrast between left-libertarians and other liberal egalitarians: (1) Self-
Ownership: Left-libertarians and other liberal egalitarians tend to agree on the extent of rights to 
be free of unconsented-to-incursions on one’s person. But left-libertarians affirm, in contrast 
with most other liberal egalitarians, the extensive alienability of rights of self-ownership—
encompassing, for example, the right to sell oneself into onerous servitude or even permanent 
slavery.21 (2) Equality: A number of left-libertarians are less egalitarian than other liberal 
egalitarians such as Rawls and Dworkin.22 This is traceable both to their primary focus on the 
equalization of entitlements to natural resources as opposed to physical and mental capacities or 
well-being and to their affirmation of the priority of self-ownership over equality when the two 
come into conflict. Left-libertarians almost universally tend, however, to be more egalitarian 
than many other liberal egalitarians insofar as their egalitarian principles have global rather than 
societal scope (e.g., require some kind of equalization for all individuals in the world). 
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 Those left-libertarians who want to occupy common ground with other liberal 
egalitarians must face the “Why bother?” challenge raised above. There are at least two answers 
to this question: First, as Fried acknowledges,23 left-libertarians have achieved something of 
significance if they’re able to disarm right-libertarians by demonstrating that a strongly 
egalitarian version of liberal egalitarianism is consistent with the same commitments to self-
ownership as those of right-libertarians. Second, even when their first-order views converge on 
those of other liberal egalitarians, the normative focus of left-libertarians remains distinct from, 
and in many respects more promising than, the normative focus of Rawlsian liberal egalitarians. 
The first answer is self-explanatory. The second answer, however, requires some elaboration. 
Left-libertarians have a shared normative focus on natural rights of ownership in self 
and in world: that is, on the question of what natural rights of self-ownership persons possess 
and on the question of what rights over natural resources in a state of nature such self-owners 
can come to acquire.  Rawlsian liberal egalitarians, by contrast, share a normative focus on the 
question of the fair division of the fruits of social cooperation among people who are regarded as 
free and equal. Left-libertarians regard the question of the conditions under which natural 
resources may be acquired as prior to the question of the division of the fruits of social 
cooperation.24 Or at least they think that the answer to the latter question must be sensitive to the 
question of the legitimacy of our claims on those resources that we use to produce these 
cooperative fruits. Any complete theory of justice in holdings therefore must include an answer 
to the following question: What rights, if any, do individuals have to acquire property rights in 
previously unowned natural resources? 
Rawlsians do not address this question, since they regard its answer as settled by the 
question of the fair division of the fruits of social cooperation in the context of societies many 
generations removed from acts of original acquisition. Left-libertarians, however, insist that the 
14 
question of original acquisition cannot be dismissed on these grounds and argue that the 
egalitarian principle of justice in acquisition which they endorse casts a shadow over the 
legitimacy of claims of ownership by all subsequent generations. On one left-libertarian 
interpretation, for example, the Lockean “enough and as good” proviso calls for members of 
each generation to ensure that, at their deaths, resources that are at least as valuable as those they 
have acquired lapse back into a state of non-ownership so that the next generation has 
opportunities to acquire unowned resources which are at least as valuable as theirs. Inequalities 
in holdings in the present-day actual world are unjust insofar as they fail to conform to such an 
intergenerational principle of justice in acquisition.25 The distinctive normative focus of left-
libertarians, that is, renders salient certain morally significant facts which Rawlsians overlook. 
From the point of view of rights of acquisition of unowned resources, the case for equality is 
different from and arguably more compelling than a Rawlsian case which focuses on a fair 
division of the fruits of social cooperation: although the more productively talented might 
plausibly lay claim to a greater share of these fruits by virtue of their greater contribution to their 
production, it is much less plausible for them to maintain that their superior talent justifies their 
acquisition of a greater-than-equal share of unowned worldly resources.26 The distinctive left-
libertarian focus also gives rise to substantive differences such as the following: Unlike the 
Rawlsian,27 the left-libertarian does not assume that strongly egalitarian principles of distributive 
justice are to be confined to a territorially closed society of social cooperators. Rather, since 
territories just are natural resources, an emphasis on ownership of resources in a pre-political 
state of nature as a primary question naturally leads to principles which are global rather than 
societal in scope.28  
 In sum, left-libertarianism is no less coherent than many other families of theories such as 
liberal egalitarianism. Moreover, the left-libertarians’ distinctive focus on ownership of self and 
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egalitarian ownership of natural resources provides a firmer foundation for the common ground 
they share with other liberal egalitarians and gives rise to substantive differences as well. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
We have not attempted the difficult task of defending left-libertarianism on normative grounds. 
Like any normative theory, it is subject to several deep and troubling objections. Here we have 
focused on the easier task of defending the claim that it is a coherent, relatively determinate, 
distinct alternative to existing forms of liberal egalitarianism.29 
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